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Introduction to Beyond the Self 
NAOKOSAITO 
Graduate School of Education, Kyoto University 
PAUL STANDISH 
Institute of Education, University of London 
This is an introduction to Paul Standish s book, Beyond the Self: 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits of Language (1992) (hereafter 
abbreviated as 'BTS '). Naoko Saito, in collaboration with five graduate 
students from Kyoto University, is in the final stage of translating the book 
(to be published from Hosei University Press). The value of the book has 
been rediscovered centring on the theme of self, other and language, and 
how their inseparable relation presented in the book can serve today in 
envisioning an alternative route to education: 'education for otherwise' 
(Standish 2002) and 'ethics before equality' (Standish 2001). The purpose 
of our dialogical presentation is to explore the possibilities and limits of 
BTS; and to show how the preliminary declaration of the author s stance in 
going 'beyond the self' has been developed since then in venturing into the 
territory of 'beyond Beyond the Self, especially in his critique of Heidegger 
through Levinas and Cavell. 
I. INTRODUCTION (Saito) 
17 
The purpose of this presentation is to provide a critical introduction to themes from 
Paul Standish's book Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits of 
Language (Standish, 1992; hereafter abbreviated as 'BTS'), and this in tum will help 
to contextualise some of the presentations to be made later in the day. Naoko Saito, 
in collaboration with five graduate students from Kyoto University (Hanako Ikeda, 
Tatsuya Ishizaki, Nobuhiko Itani, Yasuko Miyazaki, and Mitsutoshi Takayanagi), 
is in the final stage of translating a revised and expanded version of the book (to 
be published by Hosei University Press). In the intensive work of translation and 
discussion, and through undergoing the difficulty of translating philosophical concepts 
in English into Japanese, various key concepts in BTS have re-emerged in a new light 
in the contemporary scene of education-one heavily dominated by an 'economy 
of exchange' (Standish, 2005). The book is concerned with the themes of the self, 
the other and language. In its demonstration of the relation between these, it seeks 
to provide a means of envisioning an alternative possibility of education today: 
of education otherwise, as it might be put (Standish, 2002), and of ethics before 
equality (Standish, 2001). The revised original text of the book is to be published 
with supplementary material (the new Part III), some of which has been developed in 
Japan, and under a modified title-Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Levinas. 
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The purpose of our dialogical presentation is to explore the possibilities and limits of 
the book, and to see how far its primary intention of going 'beyond the self' has been 
developed. How far does it venture into a 'clearing' where a more positive vision is 
elucidated, especially in its critique of Heidegger through Levinas and Cavell? 
Paul Standish will first summarise the main themes of the book as well the 
background to the writing of the' original version. Naoko Saito will then highlight 
some key features of the book concerning the self, the other and language, and raise 
questions about them-including the question of the extent to which the author 
succeeds in going beyond foundationalism in ethics and the meaning of the 'limits' of 
language. In the final section, Standish and Saito will discuss a tum that has been made 
after BTS, a tum 'beyond autonomy' and 'beyond authenticity' towards the 'dissolution' 
of the self. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO BEYOND THE SELF (Standish) 
Let me explain something about the circumstances that led me to write the original 
text. Three factors had a bearing on the development during the 1980s of the central 
ideas I wanted to present: 
i. The political shift to the right, most especially in the US and the UK, involving: 
monetarist economic policies; hawkish foreign policies; reactionary domestic 
policies; the promotion of selfish individualism and greed. 
ii. Changes in educational policy and practice, involving: subordination of education 
to imagined economic need; the neglect of understanding, the emphasis on skills; 
the rise of managerialism in educational administration; the influence of leT and 
the rise of performativity; a new competitiveness between institutions; 'dumbing 
down'. 
iii. The hostility between analytical and continental philosophy at the time, and the 
almost exclusively analytical nature of Anglophone philosophy of education. 
Given these background conditions, then, what is it I was trying to do? I believed 
that I had discovered in Wittgenstein ways of thinking about the self and its relations 
to others (other people and other things) that were of key importance in education, 
especially against the background of the conditions described above. Furthermore, 
I found that there were resonances between these thoughts and ideas of Martin 
Heidegger, ideas that I had encountered largely through my own reading but that I 
found to be at best ignored and at worst rejected wholesale in the philosophical scene I 
found myself in. 
The book I constructed took the following form. An opening chapter tried not only 
to introduce the main themes but to provide, in what I called the Preliminary Sketch, a 
microcosm of the argument as a whole. The Preliminary Sketch introduced the theme 
of humility, which I saw as crucial for the orientation to the world that I found in the 
philosophers I was drawing on. In the development of the book this becomes linked 
with the idea of receptiveness, and this is thematised through a contrast between 
rational-assertive and receptive-responsive modes of thinking, which I first found in 
Michael Bonnett's paper 'Education in a Destitute Time' (1983), and which he in tum 
drew from Harold Alderman. This contrast is nicely evoked through an analogy with 
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the contrast between crossing a lake in a power-boat and crossing it in a sailing dinghy. 
The next two chapters sought to elaborate this contrast through the provision of an 
account of language based upon connections between Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 
On the strength of this a critique of the modem conception of the human subject was 
offered, followed by a critical discussion of the prominence of rational autonomy in 
contemporary philosophy of education. Finally, I attempted to provide a more positive 
account of an orientation beyond the self. Building on the conceptions of humility 
and receptiveness in the earlier chapters, this had implications of a more or less 
metaphysical kind, cutting across the categories of epistemology and ethics. The book 
was probably too ambitious, but this is what it was trying to do. 
With regard to the contextual factors mentioned above, and especially in relation to 
the stand-off between analytical and continental philosophy, I faced (i) difficulties in 
maintaining a secure sense of the book's potential reader, and (ii) challenges in terms 
of the style of writing. With regard to the latter, especially, and in the belief that style 
is not simply separate from substance, it was important to me to experiment with 
combinations of different voices and different registers of language. This is evident 
in part in the varied range of reference-including, of course, the book's borrowings 
from literature-but also in the shifts in discursive style and in the juxtapositions 
of philosophical registers that in other circumstances would not even encounter 
each other. I knew I was taking risks in doing this, and that I might well fail, but my 
intention was in part to disturb the reader. The way in which some of the philosophy 
I care about most does this has become all the more apparent to me in my subsequent 
work. Some ofNaoko Saito's remarks in what follows help to show why this is so. 
III. THE SELF, THE OTHER AND LANGUAGE IN BEYOND THE SELF (Saito) 
The process of translating BTS and discussion over its use of language have elucidated 
Standish's position on the self, the other and language, as well as indicating some 
limits, and this simultaneously makes explicit the role of Part III. The following 
observations go perhaps beyond the intention of the author, but the work of translation 
has shown the author's position on language: that there is no fixed core, no centre in 
the meaning of language, that language has its autonomous role beyond the hands of 
the writer, and that the dislocation of the authority of the text takes place between the 
reader, the writer and the original text. 
Language 
The author presents the view that the human being is thoroughly a linguistic being. This 
has three further ramifications: (1) there is no such thing as an immediate connection 
between the human being and the world (without the mediation of language); (2) with 
the use of language, the human being is already part of a language community, and 
therefore, the human being as a language user is already and always public; and (3) still 
we should acknowledge what cannot be said and the limits of language. 
The first point is presented most explicitly in the author's criticism of Bergson and 
Michael Bonnett's interpretation of Heidegger. Standish is thoroughly opposed to their 
positions to the extent that they presuppose some pre-linguistic state of human being. 
In connection with the first question [how could such mental developments get 
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underway?] Bonnett argues that there must be some primary confrontation with the 
world, beyond the 'undifferentiated awareness' of which Peters writes, such that there 
is a definite presocial structure to consciousness ... Put another way, this means 
that there must be some prior dwelling with things before public standards can be 
entertained (Standish, 1992, p. 212, italics added). 
It is sometimes argued that there must be some primary pre linguistic confrontation 
with the world. This is the view of Bergson for whom the distinction between 
analysis and intuition captures a fundamental difference in our awareness of the 
world ... Intuition ... involves the direct apprehension of an object's particularity. 
It is not mediated by language. The idea of a primary encounter ... is infected 
with anthropomorphism. We cannot imagine this encounter other than against 
the background of ourselves as linguistic beings. If we posit the existence of such 
encounter for beings who are not linguistic in this way, we are not thinking of people 
at all (p. 232, italics added). 
Second, the author highlights the public nature of language in his discussion of the 
converging points in Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This does not mean, however, 
a reactionary turn away from the private-towards a kind of mystification of the 
unknown. Neither does this position assimilate the private into the social realm and 
communal activity. This third position will be made more explicit in Part III in the 
author's shift away both from autonomy and solidarity. 
The later work [of Wittgenstein] repeatedly draws attention to the background 
of the social world and to the publicity of concepts. This is especially evident in 
the account of language. A word has sense only in the context of a sentence and a 
sentence functions in a language-game. A language-game operates as a part of a 
human practice. It operates out there, so to speak. Understanding, dependent on the 
language-game, is not an inner process. The language-game in tum presupposes 
a form of life, a way of carrying on together in which various practices will be 
manifest, and which necessarily extends beyond the field of consciousness (p. 30, 
italics added). 
For Wittgenstein this means that language is necessarily embedded in public 
behaviour and in shared practice. One reason for this has to do with the rules 
embedded in language and with what it is to follow a rule. A rule necessarily involves 
agreement between people in the way they behave together (p. 33). 
Heidegger writes of discourse in a way which stresses its social context. It is the 
way we articulate the intelligibility of being in the world. Essential to the idea of 
Being-in-the-world is 'concemful Being-with-one-another' ... The conversation is 
not just a manner in which language is put into effect but essential. We are a single 
conversation in that there must always be 'that one and the same thing on which we 
agree, and on the basis of which we are united and so are essentially ourselves' (ibid. 
[Existence and Being, p. 301]) (pp. 33-34). 
The necessarily social nature of language and its relation to forms of life with shared 
practices based on agreement in judgements have been foundations of the present 
argument. Language is central to the idea of a person and that language is necessarily 
public. One dimension of this publicity has to do with rules. Wittgenstein's view 
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concerning the Private Language Argument was endorsed [in earlier chapters] 
. . . to the effect that rules are essential to language and that the existence of rules 
presupposes the existence of a community. This point is not accepted by Bonnett on 
the ground that participation in a community would presuppose some (structured) 
presocial encounter with the world (p. 215). 
To admit this is not to reduce the individual to a social construct. The richness 
of the idea of language elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3 . . . goes beyond this and 
acknowledges the limits of language not only in terms of human practices but also in 
the rough ground against which it must gain purchase (ibid.). 
Third, despite the author's claims concerning the public nature of language, another 
distinctive feature of BTS is its emphasis on 'what cannot be said' and the 'limits' of 
language. This does not mean, however, a denial of the self's inseparable relation to 
language. Though 'silence' is also acknowledged in Chapter 6 especially, this does not 
mean any devaluation of the role of language in favour of a kind of pure meditation. To 
subject ourselves to the realm beyond what can be said does not mean to abrogate the 
role of language by confining ourselves to the inside of the limit of language, in a kind 
of totalisation of thought: rather it is to release ourselves to what is beyond through 
an acknowledgement of the partiality of our language and thought. Acceptance of the 
limits of language and of 'nonsense' does not involve a tum to mysticism. 
There is some connection here with Wittgenstein's remarks about the limits of 
explanation. Some things cannot be explained or argued for: they can only be shown. 
The disclosure is not a primary confrontation between objects of experience and the 
naked intellect. Rather it is a disclosure effected through the generative power of 
language (p. 28, italics added). 
The limits of language which Heidegger contemplates are primarily the limitations 
of a certain type of language-roughly, what has been characterized as the 
rational-assertive (p. 32). 
Heidegger's account of the way the proposition both can and cannot say something 
about the thing has parallels in the way Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, distinguishes 
between what the proposition says and what it shows in its use (ibid.). 
These language-games set limits on what can be said but these are not the strict 
limits of immutable boundaries. In [Wittgenstein's] earlier work it was the logical 
form of the world which set limits on the language from outside. In the later work 
there is no logical form outside the language. What confers sense is the practice of 
the language-game within the form of life. But the practice and the form of life are 
intrinsically linguistic. Hence there is nothing beyond language from which it gains 
its sense (ibid.). 
The concluding silence [of Wittgenstein] on these matters is not a reflection of 
indifference. Rather it is an expression of awe at what is beyond the limits of 
language (p. 36, italics added). 
Here, as elsewhere in Wittgenstein's work, there is a surrounding mystery: 'Perhaps 
what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the 
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background against which whatever I could express has its meaning (Culture and 
Value, p. 16e) (ibid.). 
The word-no thing, nothing that is, no being; but we have an understanding of 
things when the word for them is available (On the Way to Language, p. 87) (p. 234). 
Keeping silent is not a matter of being dumb or taciturn (as a matter of temperament): 
to be able to keep silent one must be capable of speech. The resulting silence makes 
something manifest. This may take the form of choosing to leave something unsaid 
and making clear that this is what one is doing (p. 34). 
As a part of what cannot be said, the sense of nothing must, for Wittgenstein, be 
shown, if it is to be understood at all (p. 240). 
The silence which Cordelia [in King Lear] shows is the silence of someone who can 
speak: she keeps silent. Following Heidegger, silence is here to be construed as a 
dimension of speech (p. 241, italics added). 
The desire for complete explanation is a barrier to an understanding of the mystery 
of language and its relation to Being. Renunciation of the claim to mastery opens the 
way to mystery (p. 234). 
Self and other: Beyond autonom~ towards authenticity 
Throughout this book, the author uses diverse terms to capture the self's relation to the 
other. In the process of finding adequate Japanese expressions for them, we are from 
time to time stopped short, causing us to deliberate on the concrete mode of the relation 
the author intends to show. These terms are adopted [by the author] in an attempt to 
resist four mistaken views that constitute potential threats to education. 'These are 
positivism: scientism, the prevailing idea of the human subject, and the preoccupation 
with the ideal of autonomy' (p. 222). 
The ideal of autonomy builds on this picture of the self to offer a framework within 
which the self as agent can be understood and fully appreciated. It promises a mastery 
over one's life and the realization of one's nature (ibid.). 
Rational-assertive language claims mastery over the objects which it designates. The 
idea of mastery becomes a refuge against uncertainty. It is a return to the self in its 
reinforcement of the sense of control (p. 226). 
In BTS the shift is first towards authenticity beyond autonomy. The author uses various 
related concepts of 'authenticity'. Among them are: commitment (beyond Sartre's idea 
of the self in action), acceptance, receptivity, availability, resoluteness and openness. 
But there is also a suggestion that even authenticity is not enough for what is 'beyond 
the self'. 
With responsibility comes the question of commitment. Cooper takes his 
Existentialist beyond the rather self-consciously posed questions of Sartre's fictional 
heroes to entertain Marcel's idea of availability. The 'egocentric topography' of 
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the unavailable person is then contrasted with that availability which can hear the 
call from the stranger [ibid., p. 175]. In this way I do not choose my commitments: 
they take hold of me' ... Availability to this sort of relation to the other is a sort of 
openness. But it is less than the openness which the final section of this chapter points 
towards (pp. 211-212). 
The initial commitment is then to be seen not as a decisive settling of the issue 
(like joining the party) but as a radical acceptance of the question, of the inevitable 
surrounding mystery (p. 245). 
Openness of this kind is closed off in an insistent and busy confrontation with ethical 
problems. It is no ordinary choice at all but more like an orientation or spirit which 
one allows to guide one's life. It is approached through a 'sober anxiety' which 
brings us face to face with our potentiality-for-Being, and an 'unshakable joy' in 
this possibility [Being and Time, p. 358]. Authenticity of this kind frees us from the 
limitations of a curiosity confined to an ontical understanding of the world. It is clear 
how far this distances it from the focus on action (p. 218). 
Authenticity requires a resoluteness to keep silent and hear the call of conscience 
against the clamour of the They (p. 242). 
Openness is neither an other-worldly detachment nor a stoical indifference. As 
composure it is not to be understood as a state of equilibrium in which one is not deeply 
touched. It is more like a silent affirmation expressed in the way the life is lived (p. 
245). 
In its reaching beyond the limitations of the emphasis on rationality and its 
acceptance of our projective concern, authenticity is more in harmony with the 
picture of the human subject which was developed in Chapter 4. To a great extent, 
however, it maintains the focus on the self. In Chapter 6 I shall discuss further the 
possibility and the point of looking beyond the self (p. 218, italics added). 
Humility and the ethics of the 'beyond the self' 
One of the central themes in BTS is the virtue of humility. The notion of humility 
is distinguished from its related concepts of humbleness and modesty. The virtue 
of humility does not require the complete denial of the self, and concomitantly a 
reactionary kind of altruism, but relocates the self in a richer and more comprehensive 
vision of the world. The ethical position in BTS is not foundationalist or essentialist. 
There is no stable ground to our ethical lives, and the virtue of humility is not a 
moral trait ascribed to a person. Various related virtues that appear in BTS (humility, 
receptivity, etc.) support the anti-foundationalist position of the book. The point of 
ethics is not to secure the ground of our lives, but to enable us better to undergo the 
uncertainties of life. 
Humility is a virtue peculiarly concerned with what is beyond the self. It is a virtue 
which generates receptiveness (p. 4). 
More strongly it might be held that in humility the self ceases to be a focus of 
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attention at all (p. 7). 
[T]his complacence is a lack of humility. It is a failure to recognize our own 
limitations and thus to have a true understanding of our place in the world. Lacking 
humility, we have confidence in our modes of understanding to the extent that we 
either fail to acknowledge or fail to take seriously questions which do not fall within 
the purview of either ourselves or our surrogates, the technologists (p. 14). 
The focus on humility has been used to show what is missing from that picture of 
the world in which the self is the primary point of reference both as a centre of value 
and as a vantage point on the world. The good which may come from those selfish 
virtues is not denied. What is asserted is that their flourishing-and the way they 
are conceived-stifles much that is most important in human life, and their growth 
sustains a mistaken conception of what the world is like. The characterization of 
humility is one way of showing the sort of other-awareness which can redress the 
balance (p. 23, italics added). 
It is sometimes said that Heidegger has no ethics. Heidegger does not directly address 
standard ethical problems. While this is so, it is clearly the case that his description 
of human life implies much about what the spiritual health of a human being must be 
like (p. 34). 
Something of the Kierkegaardian stance runs through Wittgenstein's comments 
on ethics to the effect that ethics cannot ultimately be a matter of the reasoned 
development of an argument. Rather it is a matter of action seen within a particular 
picture, seen perhaps in a certain light (p. 36). 
In virtue there is a need for this sense of what is beyond ourselves ... Far from 
underwriting timidity in the face of obstacles, humility encourages us to recognize 
this precariousness of our situation (p. 21). 
[W]ith regard to the desire to ground ethical beliefs, Wittgenstein resists the idea that 
there could be one foundation (p. 223). 
The notion of horizon helps to illustrate the limitations of the person's vision. This 
horizon is defined by the way in which the world is conceived. The desire for a secure 
foundation for ethics and the faith in rationality are limitations on this conception (p. 
225, italics added). 
Humility is to be associated with the relation to 'no-thing' and to a 'true seeing' (in 
connection with Weil in Chapter 6). This does not mean, however, an abrogation of the 
search for the good. The good and the true is pursued beyond the self, but without any 
fixed foundation. This position is more explicitly advance in Part III. Acceptance of 
nothing is not nihilism, but the demonstration of a continuous search for the good. 
True seeing is here not primarily a matter of the correct estimation of one's 
capabilities but a turning of one's attention beyond oneself with a receptiveness to 
truth as disclosure (p. 16, italics added). 
There is something about the true, once grasped which is inviolable. In this respect 
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it is inaccessible, and this has perhaps to do with the fact that any description we 
attempt will fall short. The true is not only the true proposition. It is partly the 
mystery of this inviolability and inaccessibility which holds us (p. 244). 
Humility s relation to the self is to no-thing; positively described, its relation-in 
terms of the self-is closer to that which is realized in the boundaries of the picture 
of the world which the person develops (p. 249, italics added). 
Remaining questions in Beyond the Self 
To what extent can the author go beyond foundationalism in ethics in his use of the 
term? The philosophical stance of BTS is anti-foundationalist: the author refuses 
the idea that 'there are immutable values' and 'the obsession with certainty within 
philosophy' (p. 20). How would it be possible to sustain the vision or the ethical stance 
of the author, without falling into the foundationalist position or into agnosticism or 
into mysticism (of being absorbed in the pure state of the dissolution of the self)? 
On the one hand, the author says that the point of writing the book is to disturb the 
audience; on the other hand, the descriptions above still indicate the possibility that this 
text will be read as the story of a conversion of a man from a morally degraded state 
to a good person. The notions of 'humility' and 'receptiveness' then will slide into a 
foundationalist position of ethics, so will the concept of the 'true'. This can be seen 
especially when the author's ethical vision and suggests its educational implications. 
While [King Lear] was calculative and assertive in his thinking he caused 
appalling suffering to those he loved, the country, and himself; when he becomes 
receptive-responsive he acquires a clearer vision of the truth, which involves a proper 
regard for others and which is a foundation for moral strength (p. 19). 
The King Lear example suggests that humility is attained as a result of the 
overcoming of arrogance. I have implied that something like this is widely needed 
today. Humility needs to be linked with a sense of the precariousness of the human 
situation. Beyond this humility is reciprocally related to a sense of mystery or wonder 
(p.22). 
Another tum that is made in BTS is from 'limitations' to 'limit'. But where are we taken 
beyond the self? In the process of translation, a criticism has been made that the realm 
beyond the limit is unclear in BTS. There seems to be a need for the presentation of 
more positive vision of the realm of the beyond. The limit in a positive sense presented 
in BTS is not rigidly fixed, as it were to divide its inside and outside. 
There is a richness to the term 'limit' which is deeply interwoven with the significance 
of limits in language ... 'limit' may carry some sense of the outward reaches of a 
situation. This seems to have a more positive significance showing the limits towards 
which one can reach. The negative sense of restriction or of shortcomings in the 
former will be conveyed by the more obviously negative 'limitation' while 'limit'will 
be used/or the more rich concept (p. 38, italics added). 
The limits are necessary for definition. Limits of this kind are like the rules of a 
game which constitute boundaries within which the game has sense. They may be 
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of the order of the outward reaches of a situation, towards which our vision, and our 
aspirations, can extend (p. 229). 
The limitations of language combine with the forces of technology. Limitations such 
as these are avoided by attention to the proper limits of language (ibid.). 
First, that a thing is named is a condition for its being entertained in thought at all. 
The name is the mark, the physical and public form which the sign must have. Second 
. . . To call something is to set limits on what is so called in terms of how it can be 
thought. Third, there is a limit in the extension of something to its full reach. The 
grammar of an expression determines this reach ... We must submit to this trajectory 
of grammar in which change is essential. The limit it reaches is an extension of our 
world (p. 233). 
Iv. BEYOND AUTONOMY AND AUTHENTICITY: TOWARDS THE DISSOLUTION 
OF THE SELF (Standish and Saito) 
How far has the book's primary intention of going 'beyond the self' been developed? 
How far does it venture into a 'clearing' where a more positive vision is elucidated, 
especially in its critique of Heidegger through Levinas and Cavell? In response, 
we shall foreground the following two points as the major theses of Part III: 
(1) that the author presents alternative concepts of truth and the good that do not yield 
to foundationalism-a position explicitly stated with reference to Emerson's idea of 
'measure-making' (Standish 2002); (2) that, after BTS, Standish takes a more radical 
tum-from 'beyond autonomy' and 'beyond authenticity' towards a partial dissolution 
of the self. 
In Part III, after BTS, the author makes more explicit and positive his stance 
against anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism. This can be seen in the shift from 
Heidegger to Levinas and Cavell. The fact that the original book ends with a brief 
reference to Cavell is symbolic. 
This move is directed not only beyond autonomy, but also beyond solidarity, and 
it points towards the dissolution of the self. He is wary of Heidegger's aesthetisation 
of politics and its concomitant effects of the abrogation of ethics-responsibility to 
otherness, in the 'romanticisation of solitude', on the one hand, and in the oppression 
of 'communal sharing' and the 'eulogy of home', on the other hand (p. 163). Thus, 
Standish complains that within Heidegger's vision, 
Those within the community are absorbed into a communal sharing (Miteinandersein, 
miteinanderteilen) that muffles the voice of the other; while other-regarding virtue is 
turned not to (other, different) people but to a piety toward being (ibid.). 
It is perhaps possible to reread this shift also as a tum beyond authenticity. This shift is 
crucially related to the alternative, Emersonian and Cavellian concept of language, one 
which has more focus on the transitory, dissolving, prophetic and intensive nature of 
language. We shall briefly describe how this radical tum manifests itself in the related 
ideas of self, the other and language. 
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Language: Poetics of the unsaid 
In Part III after BTS, there is a subtle but significant change in the author's stance 
towards 'what cannot be said', especially in his change of tone towards Heidegger. He 
is more cautious of the oppression of silence and mystification in its aestheticisation 
of politics; of a direction towards 'univocity of interpretation' and 'concentration 
or convergence' (Standish, 2002, p. 163); and the negligence of the destructive and 
the strange in the 'destinal words' (ibid.). As a result, the author claims, Heidegger 
'is incapable of recognising the significance of certain kinds of silence' (ibid.). The 
criticism represents the author's stance against solidarity and towards the dissolution 
of the self. This is also related to the author's appreciation of poetic language, the 
'disseminative power of our language and lives' (p. 165). This is to save 'what cannot 
be said' and 'silence' from its repressive outcome. 
For example, in the work of Georg Trakl the 'generating point' is in fact typically 
indicated but never reached; it remains 'dislocated in the unsaid' (p. 162). 
The figure of the stranger in Trakl's poetry is read by Heidegger as a motif for ascent 
through spiritual darkness towards the holy; yet far from being the romanticization of 
solitude that Heidegger tries to make it, the stranger is a disruptive element in Trakl's 
poetry, symbolizing affliction and exile (ibid.). 
[Heidegger's] poetics becomes a politics of the unsaid (p. 163). 
[Heidegger's] unsaid bears witness not to the immemorial but to repression. 
[His words] aestheticize ontology where things are of most pressing ethical 
concern (p. 165). 
Furthermore in Part III there is a more positive presentation of poetic language (from 
Heidegger to Emerson and Cavell)-beyond Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' (p. 
167) towards Emersonian poiesis. In Chapter 6 of BTS, the author already indicates 
the significance of poetic language (poiesis), especially in its role of calling into being 
through naming (Standish, 1992, p. 232). In Part III after BTS, however, the nature 
of this poetic language is more explicitly and positively advanced through Emerson's 
idea, with more focus on the transitory nature of language. This is a tum away from the 
'(backward-looking) nostalgia for home' and towards the '(forward-looking) electric 
intensity found in Emerson and the Dionysian Nietzsche' (Standish, 2002, p. 163). 
This is a presentation of the poetic nature of language which guides us towards the 
anti-foundationalist position of ethics in Emerson and Cavell. 
If the above account of the language-game is correct, parallels can be seen between 
its evolving and extending qualities and the poetic qualities of language which 
concern Heidegger increasingly in his late work. The poetic is conceived not as the 
purely literary but in terms of the power of language to disclose (Standish, 1992, p. 
33). 
The account of naming bears a strong resemblance to Heaney's characterization of 
the feminine mode where the language functions more as evocation than as address. 
Here also there is a sense of the calling forth of ideas/things where divination is an 
appropriate metaphor for the writer's craft (p. 233). 
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The quality of the imagination is to flow, and not to freeze. The poet did not stop at 
the color, or the form, but read their meaning; neither may he rest in this meaning, 
but he makes the same objects exponents of his new thought (Emerson, in Standish, 
2002, pp. 160-161). 
The poetic must not arrest or freeze but must be a means of conveyance of thought 
(Standish, 2002, p. 167). 
The notion of criteria is also reconstructed from the standpoint of Emerson's idea 
of 'measure-making'. It destabilises the rigid view on criteria. Such view demands 
us to choose either absolute criteria or no criteria. The 'limit' of language is in itself 
in transition; the limit is not something to set a clear boundary between the existing 
condition and its beyond; the limit in itself embodies the process of 'measure-making'. 
The sustaining of standards cannot be simply a matter of reading off assessments 
from a pre-given scale ... Our criteria stand in need of application, that is, judgment, 
and in our judgments we exercise our words. True rig our in such matters requires 
'authentic gauging', the meter-making argument of the poetic, of poiesis. Without 
such a responsibility to language there can be no raising of standards (where a 
standard is to be remembered to be a flag that we might raise and march behind (pp. 
165-166). 
In our learning we must gradually come to be able to take the measure of things, 
extending that measuring in new and unforeseen ways ... This measure-taking is to 
be understood less as the application of a preexisting measure to an already existing 
thing, than as an instituting of the very possibility of measuring (p. 157). 
It is not meters but a metre-making argument that makes a poem. The poet's role is to 
announce and to affirm. For what nature offers is to be understood not as something 
fixed or permanent-in terms of raw data or sensory impressions (p. 160). 
Ethics before equality: Beyond the authenticity of the self towards the dissolution of 
the self 
If we follow the author's position 'beyond the self', perhaps even the idea of 
authenticity should be transcended. Authenticity needs to be decentralised. Truth is not 
timeless, fixed and abstract, but discovered in the concrete context. This is more clearly 
shown in the author's recent writings in his presentation of the idea of the dissolution of 
the self (Standish, 2006), but here there is perhaps a tension between Emersonian and 
Deleuzian impulses. On the strength of the former, our selves are in translation: in our 
relation to language we are already involved in relation to the other. '[R ]esponsibility 
is realised to what cannot be directly named or represented: this is a responsibility to 
what may be, to a way of being that is always still to come' (p. 167). This represents the 
author's more explicit alliance with Emersonian moral perfectionism. On the strength 
of the latter, Deleuzian impulses, Standish draws attention to 'A Cogito for a dissolved 
Self: the Self of 'I think' includes in its essence a receptivity of intuition in relation to 
which I is already an other' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 58). Neither the acknowledgment of 
silence (of the other) nor the dissolution of the self means the abrogation of ethics and 
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the self's responsibility for an ethical commitment, that is, the search for the good life 
(Standish, 2001). 
v. CONCLUSION: EDUCATION OTHERWISE-BEYOND THE ECONOMY 
OF EXCHANGE (Standish and Saito) 
In conclusion, we shall discuss some educational implications of BTS. 
Beyond the economy of exchange 
The author is critical of the accountable notion of 'standard' and 'excellence', on the 
one hand, and of the essentialised notion of 'excellence'. He is headed towards an 
alternative notion of 'standard' in the anti-foundationalism of Emerson and Cavell, 
in their idea of 'finding as founding' -against the contemporary tide of education, 
towards the alternative concept of raising 'standards' and 'excellence'. This is the 
education of moral perfectionism, but it is not characterised by an ascent towards the 
good or the essentialised notion of the good. This is a vision of education that responds 
to the transitory nature of the self, the other and language. In line with Emerson and 
Cavell, Standish shows that there is a way to save the notion of excellence and quest 
for the good life in the dissolution of the self. This is also a Levinasian tum in that 
perfectionist education is not a matter of self-cultivation based on the ontology of the 
self but rather a limitless responsibility to the other. 
Education otherwise 
The idea that the human being is thoroughly a linguistic being implies that the 
dissolution of the self is not a return to some pure state of immediate immersion with 
the world or the emotivist rejection of human intelligence; it sustains the commitment 
to human reason. As long as we commit ourselves to language, as we must be, we are 
never exempted from being involved in the ethical life. The search for the good is never 
abrogated in Emersonian moral perfectionism. The virtue of humility embodies the 
search for the good. This is not some kind of pure spiritual education, or a return to the 
native condition, or the doctrine of self-cultivation. It encourages a thorough education 
for language and participation in the public through participation in the city of words. 
This points to education otherwise-one that acknowledges the space for the 
stranger. 'For Levinas ... in contrast, reverence attaches essentially to the asymmetrical 
relation to the other human being (the Other)' (Standish, 2002, p. 166). We are never 
exempted from responsibility to the call from the other. Ethical 'commitment' is crucial 
to Emersonian moral perfectionism. But this is not a univocal or one-sided notion of 
action. It is a fusion of receptivity and action. 
The author's alternative vision of the Emersonian teacher is of one who makes 
'the repeated return-finding new words, finding as founding, to return only to start 
again' (p. 168). We might say that this is a kind of teacher who never satisfies his or 
her attained truth, but who dares to be destabilised by surrounding darkness and by 
the stranger, and learns to subject himself to the prophetic nature of language, to be 
engaged in the conjoint task of measure-making. In this sense, the teacher is a stranger, 
too. A teacher who, in returning to the darkness of the cave, cannot simply be 'the 
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bearer of tidings with the message of destiny'. 'The teacher cannot come back to the 
darkness simply pre-armed with truth' (p. 168). 
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